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Abstract
One of the most enduring metaphors of Western medicine has been its conception of illness as an invasive
enemy against which the patient and doctor must join forces to do battle. Indeed, the more invisible and
mysterious the processes of disease, the more vividly do people seem to invoke the metaphor. So it is not
surprising to find that in antiquity, when the etiology and control of disease was considerably more elusive
than it is today, the notion of the body as a battlefield pervaded the medical treatises both implicitly and
explicitly.1
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The Andreia of the Hippocratic Physician and the Problem of Incurables
Ralph M. Rosen and H. F. J. Horstmanshoff
One of the most enduring metaphors of Western medicine has been its conception
of illness as an invasive enemy against which the patient and doctor must join forces to
do battle. Indeed, the more invisible and mysterious the processes of disease, the more
vividly do people seem to invoke the metaphor. So it is not surprising to find that in
antiquity, when the etiology and control of disease was considerably more elusive than it
is today, the notion of the body as a battlefield pervaded the medical treatises both
implicitly and explicitly.1 As the other essays in this collection make abundantly clear,
when it came to real-life warfare in ancient Greece, the principal virtue was andreia, a
term which, despite its many semantic nuances, became generally synonymous with
military prowess and an almost heroic capacity for bravery. We might expect, therefore,
that the Hippocratic physician, engaged as he was in his peculiarly relentless battle
against disease, would be readily characterized in the treatises as andreios. In fact,
                                                 
1 See, for example, Hipp. Epid. 1.11: ≤ t°xnh diå tri«n, tÚ noÊshµa, ı
nos°vn, ka‹ ı ﬁhtrÒw: ı ﬁhtrÚw Íphr°thw t∞w t°xnhw: ÍpenantioËsyai t“
nousÆµati tÚn noseËnta µetå toË ﬁhtroË xrÆ. (“The art is composed of three
things: the sickness, the patient, and the physician. The physician is the servant of the art,
and the patient must join forces with the doctor against the disease.”).  Parry 1969, 115-
16 notes the prevalence of military metaphors in Thucydides’ description of the plague at
Athens (2.47-54).
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however, there seem to be no instances in all of the Hippocratic corpus where this
happens. Andreia certainly occurs in contexts where an individual’s moral character is
discussed as a function of bodily constitution, nutrition or environment,2 but it does not
happen to be singled out as a virtue particularly associated with the medical profession.
Even the deontological works, which self-consciously address matters of professional
demeanor and business ethics, never actually use the term in the context of how the
Hippocratic doctor ought to behave. Do we conclude, then, that andreia was simply not
felt to be especially applicable to this type of ancient “warrior”? If so, when the ancient
physician behaved with what we might call “courage” or “steadfastness,” did they
themselves, and the non-professional public, conceptualize these qualities differently
from more traditional forms of andreia?
                                                 
2 E.g., De Diaeta 1.28: (on what conditions at conception are necessary for a man to turn
out éndre›oi); De aere aquis et locis, passim, but cf., e.g., sec. 16, which notes that even
a man who is éndre›ow ka‹ eÎcuxow can be undone by unfavorable cultural conditions;
cf. also sec. 23: ka‹ épÚ µ¢n ≤sux€hw ka‹  =&yuµ€hw ≤ deil€h aÎjetai, épÚ d¢ t∞w
talaipvr€hw ka‹ t«n pÒnvn aﬂ éndre›ai. Although we are chiefly concerned in
this chapter with Hippocratic texts, it is noteworthy that Galen too seems not to have used
the term éndre€a to refer explicitly to a physician’s virtue. But  see below note [15],
where Galen uses the adverbial form, éndre€vw, ironically of certain misguided
physicians. On the courage of patients in enduring pain (and its philosophical
associations), see Schrijvers 1990.
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It may be that in an age when illnesses were generally thought to arise from the
disequilibrium of the body’s physiology, the notion of the disease as “enemy” was, in
fact, so abstract and metaphorical that andreia seemed just a little too grounded in
cotidian reality to serve as le mot juste for a physician’s primary virtue. Bodies became
ill, in other words, not so much because specifically identifiable “agents” attacked them,
but because certain, sometimes nebulously construed, forces—nutrition, climate, self-
neglect, and so on—altered their internal constitutions in destructive ways. It is useful in
this regard to consider how powerfully microbiology has changed our own conceptions of
disease. Ever since we could actually see the way “germs” can cause pathology, the
notion of a “fight” against disease has become much less a metaphor than an accurate
description of prevailing Western approaches to medicine.3 But for the ancient doctor, the
battle against disease may have been less “personalized” than it often is today, and this
may explain why andreia, which could so readily conjure up vivid images of human
combat, was felt to be less appropriate as a description of his particular battles. It is
somewhat easier, after all, to anthropomorphize microbial entities as human enemies than
the natural forces that loom so large in ancient etiologies of disease.
Despite the fact that the lexical term, andreia, was not explicitly used to describe
the idiosyncratic virtues of the Hippocratic physician, however, we would like to argue in
                                                 
3 For metaphors of warfare, invasion, victory and defeat in modern culture, see Sontag
1977, 62-66. She speaks, for example, of “the American cancer establishment, tirelessly
hailing the imminent victory over cancer; the professional pessimism of a large number
of cancer specialists, talking like battle-weary officers mired down in an interminable
colonial war…”
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this chapter both that they conceptualized their activity as a form of andreia, and that, in
general, patients and the public at large expected from their doctors behavior which in
other contexts would allow them to be considered andreioi. We propose to make this case
by focusing on the Hippocratic discussions of a particularly troubling point of medical
ethics, namely, how a doctor should behave in the face of obviously incurable patients.
Here, as we shall find, a classic dilemma arises when a profession ostensibly dedicated to
healing disease and the relief of human suffering confronts a kind of battle it can never
hope to win. As the treatises show, opinions were divided about the proper way to handle
such cases, and rationality was not always their main criterion. Personal ego and the
reputation of the profession itself were often at stake in this controversy, and questions of
duty, honor and integrity evidently came into play on both sides. The treatises reveal, we
believe, that the accusations and apologies on this issue fundamentally concerned what
can only be regarded as the andreia of the physician: was the refusal to treat incurables a
dereliction of duty? did it imply a form of cowardice, like that of the proverbial
rhipsaspis, who tosses away his armor and flees a terrifying enemy?4 Or, on the other
hand, did such a physician justify his position by applying a more nuanced calculus of
knowledge and reason to the notion of courageous behavior in medicine?
Even allowing for the substantive and chronological diversity of the Hippocratic
corpus, it is reasonably clear that, as we will see in greater detail below, the “Hippocratic
                                                 
4 Jouanna 1999, 110, uses the term “noble flight” to describe how people might perceive
a physician who refused to treat an incurable patient: “…a gesture so at variance with the
heroic ideal, [that] the physician may seem to have fled from the battle against illness,
throwing down his arms in the face of danger and uncertainty.”
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position” on this issue was that in some cases it was indeed best not to take on incurable
cases. In responding to anonymous or hypothetical detractors, these treatises, once again,
never invoke andreia as such, but the arguments they deploy bear a remarkable
resemblance to the famous discussion of the term in Plato’s Laches. In fact, all the
interlocutors in the dialogue at one point or another invoke medicine (iatrikê) or
physicians (iatroi) in their attempts to articulate a definition of andreia. Insofar as the
dialogue ends aporetically, it is difficult to glean from it a definitive Platonic stance on
whether physicians could or should possess andreia, but the discussion nevertheless
clearly suggests that an association between andreia and iatrikê was commonly made,
even if some people found it unconvincing. As we shall argue, the discussion in Laches
not only clarifies the Hippocratic arguments defending their position on incurables, but
also suggests that at the core of this defense lay the fundamental assumption that
something akin to andreia ought to be seen as the primary virtue of the Hippocratic
physician.
It is often noted that ancient medicine was a very “public” activity. Since the
profession was unregulated and there were probably as many incompetent as competent
physicians, the public was often understandably wary of a physician’s claims to expertise.
Hence we continually hear of public debates between rival practitioners or schools, and
both the Hippocratic treatises, and later, Galen, depict a climate in which physicians
seemed constantly engaged in some form of debate, squabbling or even downright abuse.
It is no wonder that when they actually saw sick patients, they would doubtless have felt
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scrutinized by a wider public,5 interested in assessing not only their skill at healing, but
their demeanor and attitude along the way. Their metaphorical battle against disease was
as much a spectacle as any real battle, and the physician’s virtues as a soldier in this
battle were every bit as public as those of a real soldier.6 One can see, therefore, why a
Hippocratic physician’s decision to withhold treatment from certain cases would have
been a matter of concern that extended far beyond his private dealings with the
unfortunate patient. For just as the soldier who shirks his responsibilities on the
battlefield is in danger of being branded anandreios (unless he can offer a persuasive
explanation for behavior that on the surface will always appear reprehensible), so the
physician, whose duty to heal the sick and relieve human suffering is professed time and
again in the treatises with an almost heroic fervor, can easily give the appearance of
repudiating his own principles of combat.
The rather cantankerous author of the treatise De Arte (Per‹ T°xnhw) was clearly
reacting to such accusations from critics who regarded the Hippocratic refusal to treat
incurables as evidence that medicine was a sham “art” to begin with. Indeed, this author
regards his rhetorical mission as battle against ignorance, which seems to require as much
courage and bravery as the battle against disease itself:
ı d¢ pare∆n lÒgow to›sin §w ﬁhtrikØn oÏtvw §µporeuoµ°noiw
§nanti≈setai, yrasunÒµenow µ¢n diå toÊtouw oÓw c°gei, eÈpor°vn d¢
                                                 
5 See Jouanna 1999, 75-80 for a discussion of the “public” aspects of Hippocratic
medicine.
6 Battle metaphors for disease and treatment abound in the Hippocratic corpus. Cf. von
Staden 1987, 97-99, and  Jouanna 1999, 141 and 342-3 for many examples.
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diå tØn t°xnhn √ bohye›, dunãµenow d¢ diå sof€hn √ pepa€deutai. (1.15-
17)
…but the treatise at hand will oppose those who attack medicine thus,
emboldening itself through those it blames, well supplied by the art which it
defends, and powerful in the knowledge in which it has been educated.
When the author offers a definition of medicine in the third chapter, it is striking that he
includes a statement about incurable patients:
…tÚ dØ pãµpan épallãssein t«n noseÒntvn toÁw kaµãtouw, ka‹
t«n noshµãtvn tåw sfodrÒthtaw éµblÊnein, ka‹ tÚ µØ §gxeir°ein
to›si kekrathµ°noisin ÍpÚ t«n noshµãtvn, eﬁdÒtaw ˜ti taËta oÈ
dÊnatai ﬁhtrikÆ. (3.5-8)
[medicine is]…broadly speaking to relieve the sufferings of the sick, to mitigate
the severity of diseases, and not to attempt to treat those who are overpowered by
disease, knowing that medicine has no power over these cases.
The last phrase about incurables reads almost as a deliberate provocation to potential
detractors, especially given the phrasing of the first part of his definition, which stresses
the relief of suffering (épallãssein t«n noseÒntvn toÁw kaµãtouw), rather than
the actual curing of disease.7 Why, one might ask, should one withhold relief from an
                                                 
7 Presumably the phrase épallãssein t«n noseÒntvn toÁw kaµãtouw would imply
that a sick patient is not only relieved of his suffering, but also recovers from his illness,
but this author seems somewhat evasive on this point. A clearer statement that the
Hippocratic physician aimed both to cure his patients and to make him as comfortable as
possible can be seen in De Articulis 78: xrØ d¢ per‹ ple€stou µ¢n poi°esyai §n pãs˙
tª t°xn˙, ˜kvw Ígi¢w µ¢n poiÆseiw tÚ nos°on: eﬁ d¢ pollo›si trÒpoisin oÂÒn te
e‡h Ígi°aw poi°ein, tÚn éoxlÒtaton xrØ aﬂr°esyai: (“You should chiefly aim in
every aspect of medical practice to make the sick person healthy. And if you can produce
University of Pennsylvania Page 8 of 30
obviously incurable patient?8  But the author is either insensitive to this apparent paradox
(i.e., claiming an art of relief, but withholding it from some patients) or more interested in
addressing what he regards as the fundamental charge against medicine, that it just does
not “work.” As he says in chapter 4, people are unhappy because medicine cannot cure
everyone. When people are cured, according to the detractors, it is merely because they
would have been lucky enough to survive even without the intervention of a physician.:
…˜ti d¢ oÈ pãntew [§jugia€nontai], §n toÊtƒ ≥dh c°getai ≤ t°xnh,
ka€  fasin oﬂ tå xe€rv l°gontew, diå toÁw èliskoµ°nouw ÍpÚ t«n
noshµãtvn, toÁw épofeÊgontaw aÈtå tÊx˙ épofeÊgein ka‹ oÈ diå
tØn t°xnhn.
…but the art [of medicine] is blamed because not everyone [is restored to health],
and those who repudiate [the art], because there are some who are defeated by
diseases, say that those who manage to escape them, do so because they’re simply
lucky and not because of the art.
Our author does not deny the force of luck, but argues, as one might expect, that the
technê of the physician demonstrably abets whatever fortune might hold for a patient
(Chs. 5-7). Since most people, he argues, even those who never seek a doctor, would
                                                                                                                                                              
health in a variety of ways, you should choose the method that causes the least
discomfort”).
8 For a full treatment of the question of “incurable” diseases and patients in the
Hippocratic corpus, see von Staden 1987. Von Staden discusses at length the many ways
“incurability” could be expressed in the corpus (cf. esp. 75-84), and notes that two
approaches seemed current—a binary one (patients and diseases were deemed either
curable or non-curable), and a gradational one (they might be curable or incurable
depending on external contingencies or an idiosyncratic array of symptoms).
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agree that some sort of intervention is called for in the face of a disease (changing a diet
or climate, for example),9 it is difficult to deny that a technê that rationalizes and
systematizes such intervention would be even more useful to humanity than simply
stumbling upon effective treatments haphazardly.
But one can see the trap that the author is unwittingly setting for himself with
every step of his argument, and, ironically, we can anticipate the objection to a position
advocating non-intervention in incurable cases. If the author, after all, has just finished
arguing that one is generally better off not leaving the course of an illness up to chance
and fortune, but rather should seek medical advice, why in the case of incurables, should
one refuse to intervene, if only to alleviate suffering and (one might argue) make the
body possibly more receptive to a chance recovery? The specific charge laid against the
Hippocratic position, according to the author in Ch. 8, is that physicians limit themselves
to cases which would “cure themselves” (aÈtå Íf' •aut«n ín §jugiãzoito),10 while
avoiding those where “there is a need of great assistance” (§pikour€hw de›tai µegãlhw):
                                                 
9 De Arte 5.9-11pollØ går énãgkh ka‹ toÁw µØ xrvµ°nouw ﬁhtro›si,
nosÆsantaw d¢ ka‹ Ígiasy°ntaw eﬁd°nai, ˜ti µ dr«nt°w ti µ µØ dr«ntew
Ígiãsyhsan: [“For there is no denying that even those who don’t use doctors, but who
recover from illness, realize that they have been cured because of something that they’ve
done or not done.”]
10 I take it that this really means something like this: “in cases where patients do recover,
they would have recovered on their own, without the medical art” rather than that
“physicians only take on cases which would otherwise cure themselves,” since obviously
physicians routinely treat patients who end up not being cured. The phrasing is elliptical
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eﬁs‹ d° tinew o„ ka‹ diå toÁw µØ §y°lontaw §gxeir°ein to›si
kekrathµ°noisin ÍpÚ t«n noushµãtvn11 µ°µfontai tØn ﬁhtrikØn,
l°gontew …w taËta µ¢n ka‹ aÈtå Íf' •aut«n ín §jugiãzoito, ì
§gxeir°ousin ﬁ∞syai, ì d' §pikour€hw de›tai µegãlhw, oÈx ëptontai,
de›n d¢, e‡per ∑n ≤ t°xnh, pãny' ıµo€vw ﬁ∞syai.
And there are some who also blame medicine because of those who are unwilling
to take on patients who have been defeated by their disease; they say that the
cases which they attempt to cure are those which which would be cured on their
own anyway, but that they don’t touch the cases where there is need of great
assistance. But (they say), if medicine is in fact an art, then it ought to cure all
cases alike.
The detractors maintain that if medicine were really a technê, it would at least attempt to
cure all patients,12 not just the “easy” cases which would be cured anyway. This objection
                                                                                                                                                              
here, but seems to assume that the physician will prognosticate about the patient’s
condition, and only decide to treat him if he calculates that there is a good chance of
recovery. On Hippocratic prognostication and andreia, see below pp. [000].
11 Cicero seems to be translating this expression in De Att. 16.15.5, when he turns in his
letter from public affairs to his domestic troubles: sed me, mi Attice, non sane hoc quidem
tempore movet res publica, non quo aut sit mihi quicquam carius aut esse debeat, sed
desperatis etiam Hippocrates vetat adhibere medicinam.
12 I understand there to be an ellipse of §gxeir°ousin with the second ﬁ∞syai. What they
want is for a physician to take on any sick patient, regardless of the chances of recovery;
they certainly would not assume that a physician would successfully cure every patient.
In point of fact, there is plenty of evidence outside of this treatise that Hippocratic
physicians did treat hopeless cases, and it seems clear that the matter was one of
perennial debate. For discussion and references, see Wittern 1979, von Staden 1987, 76
n.1, 102-12, Jouanna 1999, 109-11; see also van der Eijk 1999.
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seems simple enough, but it has several revealing implications. First, it clearly assumes a
normative model of medicine: if one is going to make the claim that medicine is a technê,
then one will assume that a technê will behave according to certain protocols, that there
are certain things it should do if it can legitimately be considered a technê. So if one
claims that the technê of medicine is to do one thing (e.g., minister to the sick), you
cannot then claim that it also does not do that very thing (e.g., when it says it will not
treat the incurably sick). In other words, the refusal to treat incurables is here essentially
portrayed by the detractors as a repudiation  of the stated principles of the technê of
medicine. Thus, the physician who takes such a position is put in a terrible bind, for he is
exposed as either an unethical hypocrite or a simple charlatan who conspires with his
colleagues to take on only those cases which will make their empty profession look good.
It is clear that the author of De Arte deeply resented the implication that the
refusal to treat incurables constituted an ethical breach, and he spends the rest of Chapter
8 attempting to explain the position.13 The core of his explanation lies in an appeal to the
proper knowledge of what medicine is and is not capable of doing, and the rational
application of this knowledge. Simply put, he says in so many words that medicine has
no business trying to fight a battle it cannot hope to win; and it is the technê itself which
provides the knowledge necessary to determine when this might be the case:
˜tan oÔn ti pãy˙ ênyrvpow kakÚn ˘ kr°sson §st‹ t«n §n ﬁhtrikª
Ùrgãnvn, oÈd¢ prosdokçsyai toËtÒ pou de› ÍpÚ ﬁhtri k∞w
krathy∞nai ên:
                                                 
13 See Cordes 1994, 122-24; for further bibliography on De Arte, see Cordes, p. 101, n.
63.
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So whenever a person suffers from something bad which is stronger than the tools
available to medicine, then one can hardly expect that it can be defeated by
medicine.
This leads him to conclude that some cases are simply “inappropriate” for the physician
to take on, because he has no means strong enough to defeat the disease:
oﬂ µ¢n oÔn µeµfÒµenoi toÁw to›si kekrathµ°noisi µØ §gxeir°ontaw
parakeleÊontai ka‹ œn µØ prosÆkei ëptesyai oÈd¢n ∏sson µ œn
prosÆkei: parakeleuÒµenoi d¢ taËta, ÍpÚ µ¢n t«n oÈnÒµati ﬁhtr«n
yauµãzontai, ÍpÚ d¢ t«n ka‹ t°xn˙ katagel«ntai.
Those who blame physicians who don’t take on incurable cases, urge them to treat
inappropriate cases no less than appropriate ones. In urging this, they may be
admired by people who call themselves physicians, but they are ridiculed by
“real” physicians [lit.: phyicians versed in technê].
Behind this curious statement about “inappropriate” and “appropriate” cases, it seems,
lies a contemporary clash between people who expect from their physicians an engaged
compassion for the sick patient regardless of the illness, and physicians whose cool,
rational attitude towards the nature of illness allows them to keep their distance from
patients they deem incurable. This author, in fact, turns the tables and practically accuses
any physician who takes on a desperate case of charlatanism (“physicians in name only”).
Yet, from the second sentence quoted above, many people admired such a physician and
presumably found his behavior ethically correct, if not plainly heroic. The author of De
Arte stands his ground, however, maintaining that praise or blame emanating from such
people is “foolish” (aphrones), and that the real physician should heed only those who
have “rationally calculated at what point the activities of craftsmen become finally
complete” (lelogisµ°nvn prÚw ˜ ti aﬂ §rgas€ai t«n dhµiourg«n teleut≈µenai
plÆreiw eﬁs‹). The author’s disdain for the opinions of anyone but an initiated
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professional, indeed for any unphilosophized position on a medical subject, is palpable. It
is easy to see from this little vignette that the Hippocratic physician who refused certain
cases as a matter of principle might run counter to popular notions of medical ethics, and
risked appearing not only arrogant, but also cowardly.
This controversy, then, between Hippocratic professionals and certain unspecified
antagonists ultimately rests on two opposing ways of conceptualizing medicine as a form
of combat. On the one hand, some (presumably non-Hippocratic) physicians, considered
“foolish” by our author, plunge headlong into the battle against disease, indiscriminately
taking on all cases, and evidently reaping great renown for it (yauµãzontai). Patients
may die, and these physicians may well expect such an outcome from the start, but
people admired the fact alone that they would take on even the most desperate cases,14
just as in other contexts the same people might admire a soldier whose andreia
emboldened him against even the most insurmountable enemy.15 To the Hippocratic
                                                 
14 On the “public”, performative aspects of ancient medicine, see Jouanna 1999, 75-76.
15 Galen notes that in his time some physicians (whom he regards as disingenuous—
prospoiouµ°noi) resorted to extreme, even self-sacrificial, forms of showmanship in
the name of andreia; cf. his remarks in De Meth. Med. 10 about physicians who, when ill
themselves, tried to withstand their pain karter«w te ka‹ éndre€vw: o‰da går §n€ouw
t«n genna€vn e‰nai prospoiouµ°nvn ﬁatr«n te ka‹ kaµnÒntvn
épolluµ°nouw di' aÈtÚ toËto tÚ karter«w te ka‹ éndre€vw ıµÒse xvre›n ée‹
ta›w ÙdÊnaiw, oÈd¢n t«n parhgorik«n •loµ°nouw, éll' §n to›w trax°si ka‹
…w ¶legon aÈto‹ tØn diãyesin énaskeuãzousi diagignoµ°nouw bohyÆµasin,
oÓw §n xrÒnƒ ple€oni yerapeËsai b°ltion ∑n µ toÁw speÊdontaw éndre€vw
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physician, however, such behavior was merely reckless and irresponsible. If, through
technical knowledge and practical experience, one has rationally determined that a patient
is incurable, the only conceivable reasons for treating him would be crass showmanship
and self-promotion, which, he would of course argue, have nothing to do with proper
medicine. At least the real soldier who fights against a more powerful enemy might get
some satisfaction from the idea of martyrdom; whatever kudos a physician reaps from
joining forces with an incurable patient against an undefeatable disease, however, is
indecorously won, in the eyes of the Hippocratic physician, at the expense of his patient’s
life. It is, as the passage implies, a cheap victory that turns out upon closer examination to
be more cowardly than heroic.
The author of De Arte bristles at the insinuation that Hippocratic physicians are
morally negligent in refusing to treat incurables, and even though he does not explicitly
articulate the debate in terms of andreia, it seems that it is something very much akin to
                                                                                                                                                              
époyane›n. [“For I know that some physicians put on a show of acting nobly, who,
when sick themselves, perish by actually plowing headlong into their pain with fortitude
and courage. They refuse to take any painkillers, but treat themselves with harsh
remedies, which, as they themselves say, reverses their condition, when it would have
been better for them to apply a longer therapy than to die courageously in their zeal.”]
Clearly, this is a crowd-pleasing form of andreia, not the kind Galen would recommend
for true physicians. On the charges of cowardice against Galen himself in the
biographical tradition (that he fled an uprising in Pergamum on one occasion, and on
another that he fled from Rome to avoid the pestis Antoniniana of 166 AD), see Walsh,
1931.
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this virtue which he feels called upon to defend in the case of this particular Hippocratic
practice. This becomes especially clear, we believe, when we read De Arte in the light of
the discussion of andreia in Plato’s Laches. There, the specific discussion of andreia is
framed by the characteristically Socratic question of whether or not truly virtuous
behavior requires knowledge and reason; likewise, in De Arte, the author defends his
position on incurables by arguing that it is the only rational position to take, and the
contrary position (of treating all cases regardless of the nature of their affliction) stems
from ignorance and, by implication, vanity. As in De Arte, the discussion in Laches
centers on a discontinuity beween popular conceptions of a particular social value and a
more philosophized conception of it. When Socrates asks at 190e how his interlocutors,
Laches and Nicias, would define andreia, Laches cannot believe he would ask such a
simple, easily answered question. His response, that andreia consists in “remaining at
one’s post, fighting off the enemy and not fleeing” (§n tª tãjei µ°nvn éµÊnesyai
toÁw poleµ€ouw ka‹ µØ feÊgoi) seems obvious enough to him, as it would to most
people,16 even though Socrates predictably finds it inadequate as a definition. A similar
notion of “endurance” at any cost in the face of the enemy seems to be what informs the
popular belief intimated in De Arte that physicians should take on even the most
                                                 
16 See 197b, where Nicias, in a final flourish, distinguishes a popular conception of
courage from his own more rigorous conception, which requires the application of
knowledge: “And so the things that you and the many call ‘courageous,’ I call ‘bold’,
whereas the acts performed with intelligence are the ones I call ‘courageous.’” (taËt'
oÔn ì sÁ kale›w éndre›a ka‹ oﬂ pollo€, §g∆ yras°a kal«, éndre›a d¢ tå
frÒniµa per‹ œn l°gv.)
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desperate patients. We can see, therefore, why the Hippocratic author of the treatise
might feel rather defensive, since if the ethic of “remaining at one’s post and not fleeing”
was commonly transferred to the realm of medicine, those who did not do so, even for
principled reasons, could easily be branded cowards.
In Laches, however, as in De Arte, the prudence of such unreflective engagement
with an enemy is questioned. Socrates asks Laches at 193a3 to consider which of two
men he would consider the more andreios:
SV. éll' §n pol°µƒ karteroËnta êndra ka‹ §y°lonta µãxesyai,
fron€µvw logizÒµenon, eﬁdÒta µ¢n ˜ti bohyÆsousin êlloi aÈt“,
prÚw §lãttouw d¢ ka‹ faulot°rouw µaxe›tai µ µey' œn aÈtÒw §stin, ¶ti
d¢ xvr€a ¶xei kre€ttv, toËton tÚn µetå t∞w toiaÊthw fronÆsevw ka‹
paraskeu∞w karteroËnta éndreiÒteron ín fa€hw µ tÚn §n t“ §nant€ƒ
stratop°dƒ §y°lonta Ípoµ°nein te ka‹ kartere›n;
Well, suppose a man endures in battle, and his willingness to fight is based on
wise calculation because he knows that others are coming to his aid, and that he
will be fighting men who are fewer than those on his side, and inferior to them,
and in addition his position is stronger: would you say that this man, with his kind
of wisdom and preparation, endures more courageously or a man in the opposite
camp who is willing to remain and hold out? [tr. Sprague]
Laches’ first response is that the man in the “opposite camp” is the more brave; he is not
given time to expatiate, but he doubtless reflects the attitude of most of his
contemporaries. The first man might be admirable in his own way, but his endurance is
safer and more predictable, and, Laches might say, it is less easy to describe him as
“courageous,” at least according to common usage, than the weaker opponent who holds
out against him even to the point of his own defeat. Socrates, however, presses his point
with similar examples, and Laches must agree with him at 193c9 that “people like this
take risks and endure more foolishly than those who do it with techne” (ka‹ µÆn pou
éfronest°rvw ge...oﬂ toioËtoi kinduneÊous€n te ka‹ karteroËsin µ oﬂ µetå
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t°xnhw aÈtÚ prãttontew) And since they had earlier agreed (192d) that “foolish
daring and endurance is both shameful and injurious” (...aﬁsxrå ≤ êfrvn tÒlµa te
ka‹ kart°rhsiw...§fãnh ≤µ›n oÔsa ka‹ blaberã, 193d1), Laches realizes that he
seems to have contradicted himself.
The connections between this section of Laches and the position of De Arte
should be strikingly clear. Socrates’ hypothetical “knowledgeable” soldier is precisely
analogous to the Hippocratic physician in De Arte who undertakes only those cases
which make sense for him based on his knowledge of the medical technê, while the
valiant and tenacious, but weak and ignorant soldier, who endures in the name of an ill-
understood notion of andreia, parallels the physician willing to take on even the most
hopeless patient in the hope of reaping popular thauma.17 Both Socrates and the author of
De Arte are working to refine popular conceptions of “courageous” behavior by
                                                 
17 The closing paragraph of de Arte reiterates the connection between the knowledge that
comes with a technê and proper ethical behavior—in this case, the refusal to treat very
problematic cases: ˜ti µ¢n oÔn ka‹ lÒgouw §n •vutª eÈpÒrouw §w tåw §pikour€aw
¶xei ≤ ﬁhtrikØ, ka‹ oÈk eÈdiory≈toisi dika€vw oÈk ín §gxeir°oi tªsi
noÊsoisin, µ §gxeireuµ°naw énaµartÆtouw ín par°xoi, o· te nËn legÒµenoi
lÒgoi dhloËsin a· te t«n eﬁdÒtvn tØn t°xnhn §pide€jiew... [“that medicine is well
stocked with rational arguments in itself to come to its aid, and that it would justly not
attempt to treat illnesses which are difficult to cure, or would make those who did take
them on error-free, both the discussions of this treatise, and the demonstrations of those
who understand the craft, make clear.”]
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emphasizing the importance of knowledge and rationality for evaluating the outcome of
our actions.
The argument in Laches proceeds even further, as Nicias takes over as Socrates’
interlocutor and presses the notion, which he attributes ultimately to Socrates (194d), that
courage is a kind of wisdom (doke› ènØr sof€an tinå tØn éndre€an
l°gein)—specifically the knowledge of “what is terrible and what is to be dared in war,
and all other situations” (tØn t«n dein«n ka‹ yarral°vn §pistÆµhn ka‹ §n
pol°µƒ ka‹ §n to›w êlloiw ëpasin, 195a). This line of argument takes the
participants along a rocky path towards eventual aporia,18 but there are several significant
ramifications for the ideas in De Arte along the way. In particular, physicians and the
technê of medicine figure in this section as a veritable leitmotif, as the interlocutors
wrestle with the problem of whether a physician’s technical knowledge qualifies them to
be considered andreioi. At first Laches brings up the example of physicians at 195b1 as a
ploy to repudiate Nicias’ equation of andreia and knowledge. Physicians certainly know
what things are “terrible” (deina), but who would consider them “courageous,” he asks
sarcastically? Nicias agrees definitively he would not either (195b6). Now, this is just the
beginning of a rather convoluted section in which the two keep returning to the example
of physicians, and it will be useful to analyze their positions in some detail.
                                                 
18 At 199c-e, it becomes clear that the argument has led them to conclude that courage
implies all the virtues and a knowledge of all goods and evils, even though they had
previously agreed that it was only a part of virtue. At that point, the argument is dropped
and the dialogue draws to a close.
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The two agree that they would not consider doctors to be “courageous,” although
Laches thinks that Nicias’ argument equating knowledge with andreia ought to lead him
to think so. Further, he places physicians in the same company as farmers and all other
craftsmen (195b6), and suggests that it would be equally absurd to consider all of these
courageous simply because they have some sort of technical knowledge. Nicias does not
dispute the absurdity, but he dismisses Laches’ example of the physician on the grounds
that he inflates what they are actually capable of doing. Here, we have what amounts to a
normative summary of the limits of contemporary medicine:
˜ti o‡etai toÁw ﬁatroÁw pl°on ti eﬁd°nai per‹ toÁw kãµnontaw µ tÚ
ÍgieinÚn ~eﬁpe›n oÂÒn te ka‹ nos«dew. oﬂ d¢ dÆpou tosoËton µÒnon ‡sasin:
eﬁ d¢ deinÒn tƒ toËtÒ §stin tÚ Ígia€nein µçllon µ tÚ kãµnein, ≤gª sÁ
tout€, Œ Lãxhw, toÁw ﬁatroÁw §p€stasyai; µ oÈ pollo›w o‡ei §k t∞w
nÒsou êµeinon e‰nai µØ énast∞nai µ énast∞nai; toËto går eﬁp°: sÁ
pçsi f∫w êµeinon e‰nai z∞n ka‹ oÈ pollo›w kre›tton teynãnai; (195c7-d2).
[Laches says what’s not true…] Because he supposes that physicians know
something more about the sick than how to say what is healthy and what is
sick.But surely that’s all they really know; and if recovery for a patient is more
terrible than being sick, do you think, Laches, that doctors know this? Or do you
not suppose that for many people it’s better not to recover from an illness than to
recover? I mean, tell me this: do you say that it’s better in all cases for patients to
live, and that it’s not better for many of them to die?
Behind this line of questioning lies a debate about what sort of knowledge one could
expect from a physician, and Nicias implies that popular opinion would not expect much.
It is indeed curious that he asks Laches specifically about a doctor’s ability to decide
whether all patients are necessarily worth treating or not, and they end up agreeing that
this is beyond his normal purview. The physician’s job, according to this formulation, is
only to articulate what is or is not illness, although he essentially implies that an “ideal”
physician (who would be able to discern what is truly “fearful” [deina] and “to be dared”
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[tharralea]) would be able to prognosticate more accurately about a given disease, and
decide whether treatment was even indicated. Nicias does not seem especially hopeful
that physicians—or any craftsman, for that matter—would ever display this skill, but
several times in the discussion, they assume that it is hypothetically possible. At 195d7,
for example, Nicias claims that a physician cannot really distinguish whether a patient is
better off dead, and what things would be fearful to which sort of patient, “except the one
who knows the difference between what is and is not fearful, whom I call courageous”
(plØn t“ t«n dein«n ka‹ µØ dein«n §pistÆµoni, ˘n §g∆ éndre›on kal«). And
later, at 196d4, Socrates notes that few would be able to possess Nicias’ criterion for
courage (knowledge of the fearful and what should be dared): “neither the physician nor
the seer will understand this, and won’t be courageous, unless he can actually apply this
knowledge (§ån µØ aÈtØn taÊthn tØn §pistÆµhn proslãb˙). The possibility, in
other words, that physicians might in fact possess a genuinely informed technê about the
prognosis of diseases and the appropriateness of treatment (or non-treatment) is clearly
entertained, even if these interlocutors might be hard pressed to think of any good
examples. Nevertheless, we may remember that such a physician, however hypothetical
in their minds, would, according to Nicias’ definition, possess true andreia.
 Socrates, for his part, fundamentally endorses Nicias’ notion of andreia, but adds
that the courageous man will have knowledge of past and present deina and tharralea as
well as of future ones. Again, medicine serves as an illustrative example:
oÂon per‹ tÚ ÍgieinÚn eﬁw ëpantaw toÁw xrÒnouw oÈk êllh tiw µ
ﬁatrikÆ, µ€a oÔsa, §forò ka‹ gignÒµena ka‹ gegonÒta ka‹
genhsÒµena ˜p˙ genÆsetai:
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For example, when it comes to health, there is no art other than medicine directed
at all periods of time, which, though a single art, surveys present, past and future,
how things will happen.
He proceeds with a similar argument for farming and generalship, concluding that in all
such cases andreia consists in the knowledge of past, present and future goods and evils
idiosyncratic to each field. In part, this argument is intended to echo Nicias’ earlier
assertion at 196a2 that the seer’s art, despite its ability to describe fearful or hopeful
future events, is not necessarily courageous, since the seer need not comment on whether
such events are beneficial to a person. At the same time, however, Socrates wants to
retain the notion that andreia does imply at least some prognosticatory skill—one needs a
full and genuine understanding of how events will turn out in order to act prudently and
courageously.19 Without this, one’s behavior is little more than some form of recklessness
or madness.20
                                                 
19 If courage was felt to require knowledge of when a person can successfully fight and
when he must withdraw, one wonders what exactly Thucydides thought of the physicians
at 2.47.4, who lost their lives in droves trying to minister to the sick: “…Nor were the
doctors, at first trying to practice their therapy in ignorance, strong enough [against it].
But they especially died inasmuch as they were around it the most.” (oÎte går ﬁatro‹
≥rkoun tÚ pr«ton yerapeÊontew égno€&, éll' aÈto‹ µãlista ¶yn˙skon ˜sƒ
ka‹ µãlista prosªsan, oÎte êllh ényrvpe€a t°xnh oÈdeµ€a.) The implication
seems to be that it was essentially ignorance that killed these poor doctors, and that if
they had understood the real power of the plague, they would (and should) have acted
differently. This was no real courage, but lack of experience and insight, much as
Socrates holds in Laches. See Horstmanshoff 1989, 1992 and 1993.
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It should be clear by this point that the Hippocratic author of De Arte was trying
to make exactly this point about his own technê, even if he did not focus on andreia as
such. Indeed, his entire argument defending the Hippocratic refusal to treat incurables
privileges the same prognosticatory skills that Nicias regards as essential for the andreios
man. The physician’s ability to make a cogent decision about whether or not to take on a
case, after all, presupposes an understanding both of what a patient should fear and not
fear, and of what would be the most beneficial course of action for him. In the opening
paragraph of the Hippocratic Prognostic , in fact, we find a clearly articulated
programmatic rationale of the role of forecasting in medicine, which attests not only the
practical but the moral advantages of prognosticatory skill:
                                                                                                                                                              
20 See Nicias’ formulation at 197b-c, which Socrates would almost certainly endorse, as
far as it goes: “By no means, Laches, do I call courageous wild beasts or anything else
that, for lack of understanding, does not fear what should be feared. Rather I would call
them rash and mad…My view is that very few have a share of courage and foresight, but
that a great many, men and women and children and wild animals, partake in boldness
and audacity and rashness and lack of foresight. These cases, which you and the man in
the street call courageous, I call rash, whereas the courageous ones are the sensible
people I was talking about.” [Tr. Sprague]. See also the similar discussion in Plato Prt.
349b-51b, and Protagoras’ conclusion, 351a5-b3: oÏtv d¢ kéke› oÈ taÈtÚn e‰nai
yãrsow te ka‹ éndre€an: Àste suµba€nei toÁw µ¢n éndre€ouw yarral°ouw
e‰nai, µØ µ°ntoi toÊw ge yarral°ouw éndre€ouw pãntaw: yãrsow µ¢n går ka‹
épÚ t°xnhw g€gnetai ényr≈poiw ka‹ épÚ yuµoË ge ka‹ épÚ µan€aw, Àsper ≤
dÊnaµiw, éndre€a d¢ épÚ fÊsevw ka‹ eÈtrof€aw t«n cux«n g€gnetai.
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tÚn ﬁhtrÚn dok°ei µoi êriston e‰nai prÒnoian §pithdeÊein:
progign≈skvn går ka‹ prol°gvn parå to›si nos°ousi tã te
pareÒnta ka‹ tå progegonÒta ka‹ tå µ°llonta ¶sesyai, ıkÒsa te
parale€pousin oﬂ ésyen°ontew §kdihgeÊµenow, pisteÊoit' ín µçllon
gign≈skein tå t«n noseÒntvn prÆgµata, Àste tolµçn §pitr°pein
toÁw ényr≈pouw sf°aw •vutoÁw t“ ﬁhtr“. tØn d¢ yerape€hn êrista ín
poi°oito, proeid∆w tå §sÒµena §k t«n pareÒntvn payhµãtvn.
Ígi°aw µ¢n går poi°ein ëpantaw toÁw ésyen°ontaw édÊnaton: toËto
går toË progign≈skein tå µ°llonta épobÆsesyai kr°sson ín ∑n:
§peidØ d¢ oﬂ ênyrvpoi époynÆskousin, oﬂ µ¢n pr‹n µ kal°sai tÚn
ﬁhtrÚn, ÍpÚ t∞w ﬁsxÊow t∞w noÊsou, oﬂ d¢ ka‹ §skalesãµenoi
paraxr∞µa §teleÊthsan, oﬂ µ¢n ≤µ°rhn µ€hn zÆsantew, oﬂ d¢ Ùl€gƒ
pl°ona xrÒnon, pr‹n µ tÚn ﬁhtrÚn tª t°xn˙ prÚw ßkaston noÊshµa
éntagvn€sasyai: gn«nai  oÔn xrØ t«n pay°vn t«n toiout°vn tåw
fÊsiaw, ıkÒson Íp¢r tØn dÊnaµ€n eﬁsi t«n svµãtvn, [ëµa d¢ ka‹ e‡
ti ye›on ¶nestin §n tªsi noÊsoisi,] ka‹ tout°ou tØn prÒnoian
§kµanyãnein. oÏtv går ín yauµãzoitÒ te dika€vw, ka‹ ﬁhtrÚw égayÚw
ín e‡h: ka‹ går oÓw oÂÒn te perig€gnesyai, toÊtouw ¶ti µçllon dÊnait'
ín Ùry«w diafulãssein, §k ple€onow xrÒnou probouleuÒµenow prÚw
ßkasta, ka‹ toÁw époyanouµ°nouw te ka‹ svyhsoµ°nouw
progign≈skvn ka‹ proagoreÊvn éna€tiow ín e‡h. (Prognostic 1.1)
I hold that it is an excellent thing for a physician to practice forecasting. For if he
discover and declare unaided by the side of his patients the present, the past and
the future, and fill in the gaps in the account given by the sick, he will be the more
believed to understand the cases, so that men will confidently entrust themselves
to him for treatment. Furthermore, he will carry out the treatment best if he know
beforehand from the present symptoms what will take place later. Now to restore
every patient to health is impossible. To do so indeed would have been better
even than forecasting the future. But as a  matter of fact men do die, some owing
to the severity of the disease before they summon the physician, others expiring
immediately after calling him in—living one day or a little longer—before the
physician by his art can combat each disease. It is necessary, therefore, to learn
the nature of such diseases, how much they exceed the strength of men’s bodies,
and to learn how to forecast them. For in this way you will justly win respect and
be an able physician. For the longer time you plan to meet each emergency the
greater your power to save those who have a chance of recovery, while you will
be blameless if you learn and declare beforehand those who will die and those
who will get better. (Tr. Jones)
The emphasis on the physician’s knowledge of “past, present and future” in the first
sentence is strikingly reminiscent of the description of medical prognosis in Laches, as is
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the importance given to an intellectual understanding of the entire course of a disease.21
Further, both passages hold that the best physicians will display the best skills in
prognosis; proper technical knowledge, in short, is the sine qua non of an ethically
appropriate medical practice. Once again, this passage shows just how “public” medicine
was: the physician is fighting a battle (µ tÚn ﬁhtrÚn tª t°xn˙ prÚw ßkaston
noÊshµa éntagvn€sasyai) and all eyes are watching his performance. He aims to be
admired for his skills, but he wants this admiration to be won with integrity. As the
author states, if a physician can prognosticate well, he will be “justly admired” (...ín
yauµãzoitÒ te dika€vw) and will be shown to be a “good doctor” (ﬁhtrÚw égayÚw ín
e‡h). We may contrast this remark with the passage in De Arte we discussed earlier (see
above 000) where the author complains about unscrupulous physicians who take on
inappropriate cases in order to secure the admiration of charlatan physicians (and
presumably the public at large), ÍpÚ µ¢n t«n oÈnÒµati ﬁhtr«n yauµãzontai ( De
Arte 8).22 This author, as we have seen, chastises such physicians as part of his explicit
defence of the principle of not treating incurable patients.
                                                 
21 The passage is replete with verbs of “knowing”: progign≈skvn (twice),
gign≈skein, proeid∆w, progign≈skein, gn«nai, §kµanyãnein.
22 Not much had apparently changed even by the early seventeenth century, when the
narrator of Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (part 4, ch. 6; Landa 1960, 205) in
describing English culture to the equine Houyhnhnms, reserves this barb for the
contemporary physician:  “One great Excellency in this Tribe is their Skill at Prognostics,
wherein they seldom fail; their Predictions in real Diseases, when they rise to any Degree
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In Prognostic, the problem of incurables is likewise at issue, except in a more
positive, and slightly more oblique, way. The author’s point in the final sentence of the
quoted passage is that proper prognosis will allow the physician to treat his patients more
effectively and to “declare beforehand those who will die and those who will get better”
(toÁw époyanouµ°nouw te ka‹ svyhsoµ°nouw progign≈skvn ka‹
proagoreÊvn), and, most significantly, that if he demonstrates good prognostic skills,
he will be held blameless (éna€tiow ín e‡h) for his judgments about recovery and non-
recovery. Behind this statement lie clear traces of the contemporary debate about
incurable patients, for we can assume that when the author speaks of a physician
forecasting a patient’s death (toÁw époyanouµ°nouw), he is also thinking of that
physician’s refusal to take on such a case. Someone at some time was evidently always
“blaming” physicians for their stance on whom to treat, but, the author claims, if one can
show genuine skill in prognostics, the refusal to treat certain patients is not only
rationally defensible but morally justified.
Like most of the Hippocratic treatises, De Arte and Prognostic cannot be dated
with any precision, but there is general agreement, both in antiquity and now,23 that they
were each composed some time in the late fifth century BC. By the time Plato wrote his
                                                                                                                                                              
of Malignity, generally portending Death, which is always in their Power when Recovery
is not: And therefore, upon any unexpected Signs of Amendment, after they have
pronounced their Sentence, rather than be accused as false Prophets, they know how to
approve their Sagacity to the World by a seasonable Dose.”
23 On the dating of De Arte, see Gomperz (1910, 2nd ed.) [xx] with more recent
bibliography in Cordes (1994) 101, n. 63. For Prognostic, see Alexanderson (1963) [xx].
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Laches in the next century, then, the debates about the treatment of incurables must have
been well delineated, especially as “Hippocratic medicine”—both as an abstract construct
and a practical methodology—became more clearly articulated in contrast to other
therapeutic approaches. It is unclear whether Plato himself first made the connection
between andreia and medical prognosis, but if he did, it seems to me, he was only
expressing ideas already latent within Hippocratic deontological discourse. From the
passages we have discussed, it is apparent that, at least in the matter of incurable patients,
these physicians felt continually called upon to defend a point of view that clashed with
popular conceptions of proper medical conduct, just as in Laches, Plato’s Socrates, in
concert with Nicias, is clearly struggling towards a more rarefied conception of andreia
than what most people would presumably have endorsed. As such, the debate between
those physicians who unreflectively took on all cases regardless of their prospects for
recovery, and those who refused incurable patients was fundamentally a debate between
two conceptions of heroism, each with its own criteria for andreia. The one we might
characterize as the traditional and popular version, which valued daring and endurance
regardless of the chances of victory (and sometimes all the more in direct proportion to
decreasing odds for survival!). The other examined a given situation in which such
qualities as daring and endurance might be called for, assessed the risks, and considered
what the benefits of “courageous” action were likely to be. The criterion in these cases
was reason and knowledge, rather than reflexive emotion or a penchant for martyrdom,
but the result looked quite different from what one commonly considered andreia.
Indeed, although it may seem rather alien to us, the Hippocratic insistence on a rational
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foundation for their methods must have been a minority view that required its own kind
of andreia to pursue.
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NOTES
